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CASENOTES
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - APPELLATE REVIEW PLAIN ERROR RULE - ADVISORY INSTRUCTION TO
JURY SUGGESTING UNAVAILABILITY OF "NOT
GUILTY" ALTERNATIVE CONSTITUTES REVIEWABLE
PLAIN ERROR DESPITE ABSENCE OF TRIAL OBJECTION
AND PRESENCE OF "NOT GUILTY" OPTION ON JURY'S
VERDICT SHEET. STATE v. HUTCHINSON, 287 Md. 198, 411
A.2d 1035 (1980).
INTRODUCTION
Maryland appellate courts ordinarily restrict their consideration of ciaims of error to those raised and decided in a trial court. 1
Under the Maryland Rules of Procedure, this limitation upon the
review of civil and criminal cases is specifically applied to appeals
founded upon allegedly erroneous jury instructions. 2 Appellate
courts normally do not review disputed jury instructions unless
the complaining party has raised a timely objection to them at
I.

1. MD. R.P. 886, 1085; see Squire v. State, 280 Md. 132,368 A.2d 1019 (1977). Maryland

Rule 885 governs review by the court of appeals. The rule states:
This Court will not ordinarily decide any point or question which does
not plainly appear by the record to have been tried and decided by the circuit
court; but when a point or question of law had been presented to the court
and a decision of that point or question of law by this Court is necessary or
desirable for the guidance of the circuit court, or to avoid the expense and
delay of another appeal to this Court, the point or question of law may be
decided by this Court even though it was not decided by the circuit court.
When jurisdiction cannot be conferred on this Court by waiver or consent of
the parties, a question as to the jurisdiction of the circuit court may be
raised and decided in this Court, whether or not raised and decided in the circuit court.
MD. R.P. 885. Maryland Rule 1085, which governs review by the court of special appeals, is substantially the same as rule 885.
2. MD. R.P. 554,757. Maryland Rule 757 applies to criminal cases. Section f of this rule
provides:
If a party has an objection to any instructions, to any omission therefrom, or to the failure to give an instruction he shall make the objection on
the record before the jury retires to consider its verdict and shall state
distinctly the matter or omission, or failure to instruct to which he objects
and the grounds of his objection. Upon request of any party, the court shall
receive objections out of the hearing of the jury.
MD. R.P. 757(f). Section h of the same rule states:
An objection is not reviewable as of right unless it is made in compliance
with section f of this Rule. An appellate court, either upon its own motion or
upon the suggestion of a party, may take cognizance of and correct any plain
error in the instructions, material to the rights of the defendant even though
the error was not objected to as provided by section f of this Rule.
MD. R.P. 757(h). Maryland Rule 554 sets forth the rules governing appeal of
erroneous jury instructions in civil cases. The federal counterparts to Maryland
Rules 554 and 757 are rule 51 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and rule 30 of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure respectively.
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trial, thereby giving the trial judge an opportunity to correct any
deficiency before the jury retires to deliberate. s An exception to
this rule permits discretionary review of erroneous jury instructions in criminal cases. 4 Pursuant to this exception, a Maryland
appellate court may, of its own discretion, recognize and correct
any "plain error"5 in a trial judge's jury instructions that is
material to the rights of the accused, even though the defendant
did not properly object to the error at trial. 6 This rule of law is
more commonly known as the plain error rule.
Maryland appellate courts face a recurrent problem in deciding when to invoke their discretion under the plain error rule. In
the past, this discretion has been guardedly exercised by limiting
review to exceptional errors. 7 Moreover, in some cases the courts
have sought to limit plain error review by articulating precise
3. See MD. R.P. 757(f) & (h). See note 2 supra.
4. MD. R.P. 757(h). See note 2 supra. This casenote focuses on review by Maryland
appellate courts of erroneous jury instructions in criminal cases when no prompt ob·
jection has been raised at trial The rule governing appeals of unobjected to errors in
jury instructions in civil cases is Maryland Rule 554(e). That rule does not contain a
plain error provision similar to the one in Maryland Rule 757(h). Commentators have
noted that exceptions to the general rule requiring trial objection to preserve issues
for appeal are more readily permitted in criminal cases than in civil ones because in a
criminal trial human life or liberty are involved and the consequences of an error tend
to be more severe than in civil litigation. Orfield, Criminal Appeals: Technicality and
Prejudicial Error, 27 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 668, 673 (1937); Note, Appellate Review in
Criminal Cases of Points Not Raised Below, 54 HARV. L. REV. 1204, 1205 (1941).
Appellate court consideration of issues not raised in civil trials is discussed in Note,
Raising New Issues on Appea~ 64 HARV. L. REV. 652 (1951).
For an overview of the application of the general rule to errors in criminal proceedings other than incorrect jury instruction (i.e., unobjected to errors in jurisdiction, unconstitutionality of pertinent statutes, defective indictments, misconduct of
trial judge or prosecuting attorney, admission of inadmissible evidence), see Note,
Appellate Review in Criminal Cases of Points Not Raised Below, 54 HARV. L. REV.
1204 (1941). See also Campbell, Extent to Which Courts of Review Will Consider
Questions Not Properly Raised and Preserved (pts. 1-3), 7 WIS. L. REV. 91,160 (1932),
8 WIS. L. REV. 147 (1933); VestaL Sua Sponte Consideration in Appellate Review, 27
FORDHAM L. REV. 477 (1959).
5. The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland has spoken of plain error in the following
way: "Any error, once recognized, may be called plain error, and unless it can be held
to be harmless, it must be considered as material to the rights of the accused." Brown
v. State, 14 Md. App. 415, 418, 287 A.2d 62, 63, cert. denied, 265 Md. 736 (1972). The
court appears to distinguish between plain error in its literal sense and plain error as
a term of art. Literally, plain error is any error that is obvious or apparent to a reviewing court from its examination of the record. As a term of art, plain error is
synonymous with reviewable plain error. Reviewable plain error is error committed in
a trial court that was not objected to, but which, because it is harmful in some
material way to the rights of the accused, may be reviewed by an appellate court pursuant to Maryland Rule 757(h). Maryland courts have made it clear that not every
instance of plain error, in the literal sense of the term, is reviewable. See notes 35-41
and accompanying text infra. In this casenote, plain error, unless otherwise indicated, is used in its term of art sense.
In other jurisdictions, plain error is sometimes called "basic" or "fundamental"
error. See, e.g., Comment, Appeal of Errors in the Absence of Objection: Pennsylvania's Fundamental Error Doctrine, 73 DICK. L. REV. 496, 500 (1969).
6. MD. R.P. 757(h). See note 2 supra.
7. See, e.g., Squire v. State, 280 Md. 132,368 A.2d 1019 (1977); Dempsey v. State, 277
Md. 134, 355 A.2d 455 (1976).
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standards for determining when to recognize a trial court error not
properly preserved for appeal. 8 In the recent case of State v.
Hutchinson, 9 the Court of Appeals of Maryland addressed the
issue of whether the omission of a not guilty verdict alternative
from the jury instructions in a criminal case, coupled with a misstatement by the trial judge as to the alternatives included on the
verdict sheet, constituted reviewable plain error in light of the fact
that these improprieties were never objected to at trial and that
their detrimental impact was arguably mitigated by other advice
given the jury. In the course of holding that the error was reviewable and that the defendant was entitled to a new trial, the court
summarily rejected the line of Maryland cases that established
rigid formulas to govern application of the plain error rule. 10 Instead, the court chose to be guided in its exercise of discretionary
review by a number of broad and flexible considerations, the most
important of which was whether the error vitally affected the accll~p.cI's right to a fair and impartial trial. l l
This casenote explores the historical development and applications of the plain error rule, evaluates the strengths and
weaknesses of the Hutchinson court's decision, and examines the
possible consequences of the court's expansive reading of the
plain error rule.
II. THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF HUTCHINSON
Following a jury trial, defendant Hutchinson was convicted of
rape in the second degree. 12 His conviction was overturned by the
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, which ordered a new trial,
because of inadequacies in the trial judge's oral instructions to the
jury.13 The jury had been instructed on the different offenses of
which it could find Hutchinson guilty, but the trial judge at no
time told the jury in precise terms that it could find Hutchinson
not guiltyY In addition, the contents of the jury's verdict sheet,
which listed "not guilty" among three possible verdict choices,
were misstated by the trial judge who told the jury members that
the sheet contained "two possible verdicts, Count One guilty of
rape in the first degree and Count Two guilty of rape in the second
degree. "15 Earlier in the course of the instructions, however, the
8. See Reynolds v. State, 219 Md. 319,149 A.2d 774 (1959); Wolfe v. State, 218 Md. 449,
146 A.2d 856 (1958); Brown v. State, 14 Md. App. 415, 287 A.2d 62, cert. denied, 265
Md. 736 (1972); text accompanying notes 42-51 infra.
9. 287 Md. 198,411 A.2d 1035 (1980).
10. ld. at 203, 411 A.2d at 1038. See notes 42-51 and accompanying text infra.
11. 287 Md. 198, 202, 411 A.2d 1035, 1038 (1980).
12. ld. at 199, 411 A.2d at 1036.
13. Hutchinson v. State, 41 Md. App. 569, 578,398 A.2d 451, 456 (1979), afrd, 287 Md.
198, 411 A.2d 1035 (1980).
14. State v. Hutchinson, 287 Md. 198, 201, 411 A.2d 1035, 1037 (1980).
15. ld. (emphasis omitted).
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jury was informed that a presumption of innocence attends a
criminal defendant throughout his trial and that the state must
meet its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the offense charged before a verdict of guilty may be
returned. 16 No objection to the omission of a not guilty alternative
from the verbal instructions or the misstatement of the verdict
sheet's contents was made at trial.!' The court of special appeals
nevertheless concluded that the errors at issue constituted the
type of plain error that warrants appellate .court correction even
absent trial objection. ls It therefore awarded Hutchinson a new
trial.I 9 The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the intermediate appellate court, holding that the court of special appeals
did not abuse its plain error discretion in choosing to review the
disputed inadequacies in the Hutchinson instructions. 20
III. EVOLUTION OF THE PLAIN ERROR RULE
The plain error rule evolved as an exception to the general rule
that points or questions not raised at trial will not be considered
on appeal. In order to facilitate an understanding of the exception,
the history of the general rule in Maryland will first be explored.
Before 1825, the court of appeals had a duty to notice all
errors apparent on the face of the record even if they were not
brought to the attention of a lower court.21 During the 1825 Session of the Maryland General Assembly, a law was enacted that
permitted the court of appeals to consider an error on appeal only
if it was apparent from the record that the point or question had
first been raised in and decided by a lower court.22 Originally, application of this rule was limited to civil cases 23 because there was

16. Id. at 200-01, 411 A.2d at 1036-37.
17. Id. at 200, 411 A.2d at 1036.
18. Hutchinson v. State, 41 Md. App. 569,578,398 A.2d 451, 456 (1979), affd, 287 Md.
198, 411 A.2d 1035 (1980).
19. Id.
20. State v. Hl.:tchinson, 287 Md. 198, 208, 411 A.2d 1035, 1041 (1980).
21. Mundell v. Perry, 2 G. & J. 193 (Md. 1830) (appeal filed in 1823 and thus not controlled by the 1825 Act); Speake v. Sheppard, 6 H. & J. 81 (Md. 1823).
22. Act of February 16, 1826, ch_ 117, 1825 Md. Laws 92. Although this law was an act of
the 1825 Session of the General Assembly of Maryland, it was actually passed on
February 16, 1826.
23. For early application of this rule in a civil case, see Cus~wa v. Cushwa's Lessee, 5 Md.
44, 54 (1853).
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no firmly established right of appeal in criminal cases before
1872.24 Once the right to appeal a criminal decision was recognized
in Maryland, the limitation on review was extended to criminal
cases. 25
Current court rules of procedure applicable to both civil and
criminal cases in Maryland reaffirm the doctrine embodied in the
1825 Act by indicating that an issue must generally be presented
to and decided by a lower court in order to be considered properly
preserved for appeal. 26 This procedure is intended to promote
orderly administration of the law. 27 Justice is served by avoiding
the expense and delay of appeals and new trials based on errors
that might have been corrected by the trial court.28 Moreover, the
procedure seems to promote fair treatment of all parties by encouraging full ventilation of all issues at trial and by discouraging
surprise assertion and consideration on appeal of issues not
debated in a lower court proceeding. Thus, Maryland courts have
ruled that a party who fails to exercise his option to object to a
particular error while the matter is still within the power of the
trial judge to correct is usually deemed to have waived the error
and is estopped from raising it on appeal. 29
To preserve a claim of erroneous jury instructions in a
criminal case, Maryland court rules generally require that an
objection be made before the jury retires to consider its verdict. so
The grounds for the objection must be stated distinctly,Sl and
24. See Mitchell v. State, 82 Md. 527, 530-31, 34 A. 246, 246 (1896). Some criminal
appeals were permitted in certain limited situations of relative insignificance. Id. In
1872 the Maryland General Assembly enacted a law permitting either the state or the
accused in a criminal case to except to any court ruling at trial. Act of April 1, 1872,
ch. 316, 1872 Md. Laws 503 (current version at MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §
12-301 (1980)). In 1945 the Court of Appeals of Maryland adopted a rule that made
formal bills of exceptions to lower court rulings unnecessary to properly preserve
issues for appeal. R. Ct. App. 17, MD. ANN. CODE (Flack Supp. 1941-1947) (current
version at MD. R.P. 522(e)). This rule applies today to both civil and criminal cases.
MD. R.P. 522, 761. To obtain review of an issue on appeal, it is still usually necessary,
however, to make a prompt objection and to obtain a lower court ruling on the obj'ection. See Davis v. State, 189 Md. 269, 55 A.2d 702 (1947).
25. E.g., Swann v. State, 192 Md. 9, 11,63 A.2d 324, 325-26 (1949); Davis v. State, 189
Md. 269, 273, 55 A.2d 702, 704 (1947).
26. MD. R.P. 885, 1085; see Squire v. State, 280 Md. 132,368 A.2d 1019 (1977). See note 1
supra.
27. Brice v. State, 254 Md. 655, 661, 255 A.2d 28, 31 (1969). For a discussion of the
similar purposes of predecessor rules to rules 885 and 1085, see Basoff v. State, 208
Md. 643, 119 A.2d 917 (1956) (interpreting former rule 9 of the Rules of the Court of
Appeals); Ward v. Schlosser, 111 Md. 528, 75 A. 116 (1909) (discussing art. 5, § 9 of
the 1904 Code, the predecessor to art. 5, § 9 of the 1951 Code from which rules 885
and 1085 are, in part, derived).
28. Davis v. State, 189 Md. 269, 273, 55 A.2d 702, 704 (1947).
29. See, e.g., Banks v. State, 203 Md. 488, 495, 102 A.2d 267,271 (1954). A ruling on the
objection must be obtained from the trial court in order to preserve the matter for
appeal because, without a firm ruling by the lower court, there is nothing for an
appellate court to review. Davis v. State, 189 Md. 269, 273, 55 A.2d 702, 704 (1947).
30. MD. R.P. 757(f) & (h).
31. Id. 757(f). See note 2 supra.
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appeal of right is limited to the grounds so advanced. 32 This rule
has a salutary purpose. It is designed to furnish the trial judge
with an opportunity to correct "inadvertent omissions or inaccuracies in his instructions" while the matter is still before him. 33
Provision is made, however, for discretionary review by an
appellate court of any "plain error" in a trial court's instructions
to a jury that is material to the rights of the criminal defendant
regardless of whether the error was objected to at trial,34 Thus,
failure to observe established procedure for preserving one's right
to appeal does not necessarily preclude appellate review of an
issue.
Rule 757 of the Maryland Rules of Procedure is the source of
appellate court authority to review plain error in a criminal case. 35
Determination of the existence of reviewable plain error under rule
757(h) involves a three-stage process. First, the court must ascertain the existence of an unobjected to mistake that is apparent on
the face of the record; that is, it must determine the existence of
plain error in the literal sense of that term. 36 Second, the court

32. MD. R.P. 757(h). See note 2 supra.
33. Parker v. State, 4 Md. App. 62, 67, 241 A.2d 185, 188 (1968), appeal after remand, 7
Md. App. 167, 254 A.2d 381 (1969), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 984 (1971).
34. MD. R.P. 757(h). It is important to note at this juncture that, although the purpose
behind the portion of rule 757 requiring objection at trial has been distinctly stated,
see text accompanying note 33 supra, no Maryland court to date has clearly and unequivocally articulated the purpose behind that portion of rule 757 (or its
predecessors) which allows discretionary review of erroneous instructions to which no
trial objection is made. This lack of explicitly stated purpose is compounded by the
absence of any clear judicial declaration regarding which portion of the rule is to be
given priority. These voids have probably contributed to the varied interpretations
and applications of the plain error rule in the past. The inclusion of a provision for
discretionary review of plainly erroneous jury instructions in earlier rules, from
which the current rule 757 is derived, appears to reflect a recognition on the part of
the draftsmen of those rules that, as important as courtesy to the trial judge and
proper observance of procedural rules are, it is even more essential that the defendant
receive a fair trial, free of harmful error. The plain error rule is designed to furnish
this protection, yet no clear judicial enunciation of this purpose exists in Maryland to
furnish guidance for appellate courts confronted with the question of when to invoke
their powers of discretionary review. Had the design of the plain error rule been
clarified at an earlier time and had this overall scheme been perceived by courts in the
past, instances of inconsistent application of the rule might have been minimized and
Maryland courts might not have felt compelled to formulate hard·and-fast rules to
govern the exercise of discretionary appellate review of plain error. For a discussion
of the cases that have formulated these strict and often inappropriate standards, see
notes 42-51 and accompanying text infra.
The plain error rule is complimented by the right to effective assistance of
counsel, guaranteed by the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution, see
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), because both are designed to assure that a
criminal defendant is protected from inadequate representation at trial and thereby
receives the fair trial to which he is constitutionally entitled.
35. See note 2 supra.
36. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 14 Md. App. 415, 287 A.2d 62, cert. denied, 265 Md. 736
(1972). See note 5 supra.
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must evaluate the prejudicial nature of the error to determine if it
is material to the rights of the accused. 37 In other words, it must
determine that the error was harmful to the defendant. 38 Maryland courts have made it clear, however, that even in those situations in which an error in jury instructions has resulted in some
prejudice to a defendant, plain error review is not necessarily warranted. 39 Rule 757(h) states that appellate courts "may" review
such errors;40 it does not mandate review. Because discretion to
review still exists even when an error results in some prejudice to
37. Brown v. State. 14 Md. App. 415. 418. 287 A.2d 62. 63. cert. denied, 265 Md. 736
(19721. The Hutchinson court equated the phrase "material to the rights of the
defendant" used in Maryland Rule 757(hl with the phrase "vitally affecting his right
to a fair and impartial trial." 287 Md. 198. 202.411 A.2d 1035. 1038 (19801.
38. See Brown v. State. 14 Md. App. 415. 418. 287 A.2d 62. 63. cert. denied, 265 Md. 736
(19721. The court in Brown stated that "unless [plain error in its literal sense) can be
held to be harmless it must be considered material to the rights of the accused." Id.
An examination of the relationship between the plain error rule and the doctrine
of harmless error may be helpful. The doctrine of harmless error appears to focus on
whether an error is reversible. while the plain error rule. as expressed in Maryland
Rule 757(hl. addresses whether an error is reviewable. See Dempsey v. State. 277 Md.
134. 355 A.2d 455 (19761. The test in Maryland for determining the harmlessness of
an error under the harmless error doctrine was set forth in Dorsey v. State. 276 Md.
638. 350 A.2d 665 (19761:
[W)hen an appellant. in a criminal case. establishes error. unless a reviewing
court. upon its own independent review of the record. is able to declare a
belief. beyond a reasonable doubt. that the error in no way influenced the
verdict. such error cannot be deemed "harmless" and a reversal is mandated.
Id. at 659. 350 A.2d at 678. Chief Judge Murphy's concurring opinion in Dorsey suggests that. for purposes of deciding if reversal of a conviction is warranted. the standard for determining the harmlessness of an error that is not of constitutional dimension may be less exacting. Id. at 662. 350 A.2d at 680. It is difficult to conceive of an
error that would be considered reviewable under the plain error rule yet harmless
under the harmless error doctrine. because the error would have to be substantial
enough to be material to the rights of the accused and. at the same time. trivial
enough to convince the reviewing court beyond a reasonable doubt that it had no
effect on the judgment or verdict. Thus. whenever an unobjected to error in jury
instructions is determined to be harmful enough to be reviewable. it will, in all
likelihood. be considered harmful enough to warrant reversal and award of a new
trial. For further discussion of harmless error. see R. TRAYNOR. THE RIDDLE OF
HARMLESS ERROR (19701; Field. Assessing the Harmlessness of Federal ConstitutionalError - A Process in Need ofaRationale. 125 U. PA. L. REV. 15 (19761; Mause.
Harmless Constitutional Error: The Implications of Chapman v. California, 53 MINN.
L. REV. 519 (19661; Saltzburg. The Harm of Harmless Error, 59 VA. L. REV. 988
(19731; Comment. Harmless Constitutional Error, 20 STAN. L. REV. 83 (19671; Note.
The Harmless Error Rule Reviewed, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 450 (19471.
39. Sine v. State. 40 Md. App. 628. 632. 394 A.2d 1206. 1209 (19781. cert. denied, 284 Md.
748 (19791. See note 54 infra.
40. MD. R.P. 757(hl. See note 2 supra. While instructional errors that violate a criminal
defendant's constitutional rights might normally be expected to be considered material by an appellate court faced with the question of whether plain error review is
appropriate. see. e.g., Stambaugh v. State. 30 Md. App. 707. 710. 353 A.2d 638.640.
cert. denied, 278 Md. 734 (19761. there is supportive authority for the proposition that
review is discretionary even when the error is of constitutional dimension. See Squire
v. State. 32 Md. App. 307.309.360 A.2d 443.445 (19761. rev'd, 280 Md. 132.368 A.2d
1019 (19771. Although the court of al)peals reversed the judgment of the court of
special appeals in Squire, it did not address or expressly controvert the assertion of
the intermediate appellate court that the bare fact that an error is of constitutional
proportion does not per se raise it to the level of reviewable plain error. Id.
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the accused, appellate courts generally engage in a third step:
they evaluate the error to determine if it is sufficiently serious or
harmful to merit review in the absence of trial objection. 41
Imposing and observing appropriate limits on the exercise of
discretionary review power granted under the plain error rule has
been a difficult and recurrent problem for Maryland appellate
courts. In the past, some courts have struggled to articulate precise standards to govern the exercise of discretionary review in a
manner consistent with the restricted circumstances under which
they perceived that such review was to be conducted. In Wolfe v.
State 42 and Reynolds v. State,43 the court of appeals enunciated a
rule that has been employed in subsequent cases 44 to determine
the circumstances that justify an appellate court's cognizance of
unobjected to plain error. According to Reynolds, when an unobjected to error in jury instructions could have or probably would
have been corrected by the trial judge had it been promptly
brought to his attention, an appellate court should not recognize
the error on appea1. 45 Conversely, when the error is such that even
if it had been promptly called to the attention of the trial judge
correction of the resulting prejudice could not or probably would
not have occurred, the lack of objection will be excused, and the
error is reviewable. 46
In Brown v. State,47 the court of special appeals attempted to
draw a more precise line of demarcation between reviewable and
nonreviewable plain error based upon the Wolfe and Reynolds
decisions. In these two decisions the court of appeals had reached
different conclusions regarding the reviewability of unobjected to
errors in jury instructions. 48 By comparing them, the Brown court
developed a standard pursuant to which material plain error
would be reviewed if it constituted "an error of commission by the
41. See, e.g., Sine v. State, 40 Md. App. 628, 394 A.2d 1206 (1978), cert. denied, 284 Md.
748 (1979).
42. 218 Md. 449, 146 A.2d 856 (1958). In Wolfe, the trial judge suggested in the jury's
presence that the accused, who was not represented by counsel, should take the
stand and testify because the case against him was substantial. [d. at 452, 146 A.2d
at 857. The court determined that this error could not have been corrected even if
promptly pointed out at trial. [d. at 455, 146 A.2d at 859. Therefore, the court
excused defendant's lack of objection, recognized the error on appeal, and awarded a
new trial.
43. 219 Md. 319,149 A.2d 774 (1959). In Reynolds, the trial court did not fully explain to
the jury the offenses charged or the elements thereof. [d. at 324, 149 A.2d at 777. No
objection was raised by the defendant at trial. The error was held unreviewable
because it could have been rectified had it been brought promptly to the trial judge's
attention. [d. at 324-25, 149 A.2d at 777.
44. See, e.g., State v. Evans, 278 Md. 197,211,362 A.2d 629, 637-38 (1976); Sine v. State,
40 Md. App. 628, 632-33, 394 A.2d 1206, 1210 (1978), cert. denied, 284 Md. 748
(1979).
45. 219 Md. 319, 324-25, 149 A.2d 774, 777 (1959).
46. WoHe v. State, 218 Md. 449, 455, 146 A.2d 856, 859 (1958).
47. 14 Md. App. 415, 287 A.2d 62, cert. denied, 265 Md. 736 (1972).
48. See notes 42 & 43 supra.
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trial judge, that is, an error in something the judge said, the effect
of which could not be overcome by additional instructions. "49 A
mistake would not be reviewed, however, if it were simply" one of
omission, or something [the trial judge] failed to say."50 Mechanical application of either the correctability standard enunciated in
Wolfe and Reynolds or the commission-omission standard fashioned in Brown, leaves no room for appellate court consideration
of the gravity of the disputed error or its harmfulness to the rights
of the accused. In apparent recognition of this fact, the Brown
court, after composing its general guideline, felt compelled to note
that the ultimate consideration in deciding when to review plain
error is whether "correction is necessary to serve the ends of fundamental fairness and substantial justice. "51

49. 14 Md. App. 415, 420, 287 A.2d 62,64, cert. denied, 265 Md. 736 (1972) (emphasis in
original).
50. ld. (emphasis in original). The Brown court's reasons for formulating a commissionomission test are not entirely clear. The court stated that this "guideline" was
gleaned from a comparison of the Wolfe and Reynolds cases. ld. See notes 42 & 43
supra. These two cases do not, however, support this proposition. The mere fact that
the court of appeals chose to review an error involving something the trial judge had
said in one instance and denied review of an alleged omission from a jury charge in
another does not mean that the court intended only for errors of commission to be
reviewable. While the definitive guidance furnished by the absolute rule proposed in
Brown is attractive in comparison to the aimlessness of a "fundamental fairness and
substantial justice" standard, see Evans v. State, 28 Md. App. 640, 650-51, 349 A.2d
300,309 (1975), afrd, 278 Md. 197,362 A.2d 629 (1976); Brown v. State, 14 Md. App.
415, 422, 287 A.2d 62, 65 (1972), the Brown standard overlooks the fact that an
instructional omission can be just as damaging to the accused's rights and, hence, as
deserving of correction as an error of commission. In its use of the term "irremediable
error of commission," id., the Brown court was apparently contemplating those situations in which the trial judge affirmatively gives the jury an instruction that incorrectly states the relevant legal principles. ld. at 421, 287 A.2d at 65. Perhaps the
court believed that such errors of commission are more likely to have incurable prejudicial effects on a jury and, therefore, more frequently warrant appellate court correction. It appears more likely, however, that the court's standard is based on a misreading of the two cases. Moreover, the standard was mere dicta because, after it was
enunciated, the Brown court proceeded to decide the case under the Wolfe-Reynolds
standard, determining that the error in question was not reviewable as it could have
been corrected had it been brought to the attention of the trial judge. ld. at 422, 287
A.2d at 65. Thus, although the commission-omission standard has been utilized by a
number of courts since its creation, see, e.g., Dove v. State, 47 Md. App. 452, 456, 423
A.2d 597, 600 (1980); Ross v. State, 24 Md. App. 246, 330 A.2d 507 (1975); Taylor v.
State, 17 Md. App. 41, 299 A.2d 841 (1973), its persuasive and precedential value is
questionable.
51. 14 Md. App. 415,422,287 A.2d 62, 65, cert. denied, 265 Md. 736 (1972). Indeed, this
would always seem to be the paramount factor whenever an appellate court is considering whether to review a point not raised below. See T. MARVELL, ApPELLATE
CoURTS AND LAWYERS 121-25 (1978).
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More recently, Maryland appellate courts have employed
other criteria that allows them to somewhat confine the exercise of
plain error discretion and yet still engage in the process of evaluating the seriousness of a contested instructional error to see if it
merits review. They have recognized that, in the past, errors have
been deemed reviewable absent proper objection at trial only
when they are susceptible to characterization as "exceptional"52
or "compelling."53 Because these terms are so broad, they are subject to inconsistent application. They do, however, provide some
assistance in determining when discretionary review is appropriate as they indicate an intention on the part of past appellate
courts to confine the realm of reviewable plain error. In addition,
they signal a recognition that the granting of discretionary review
is not to be the ordinary practice. The fact remains, however, that
"no constant and immutable guidelines" exist to govern the exercise of discretionary review under the plain error rule. 54 A determination that circumstances are sufficiently exceptional or compelling may only be made after preliminary review of the alleged
error in the context of the facts, circumstances, and history of the
case under consideration. 55 This case-by-case approach renders the
plain error rule subject to capricious application. As the situation
now stands, plain error is essentially whatever a reviewing court
says it is.56
Before State v. Hutchinson, 57 no Maryland court had ever
addressed the issue of whether an inadvertent omission of a not

52. Dempsey v. State, 277 Md. 134, 142, 355 A.2d 455,459 (1976). In Dempsey, the trial
judge, prior to submitting to the jury the issue of voluntariness of the criminal defendant's confession, instructed jurors that he had already made a preliminary finding
of voluntariness. ld. at 137, 355 A.2d at 457. Because this comment clearly showed
the trial court's opinion on an issue that was for the jury, the error was determined
sufficiently exceptional to be reviewable despite the absence of trial objection. ld. at
143, 355 A.2d at 460. The court held that the error was grounds for reversal because
the judge's expression of opinion was "liable to influence the jury on an important
question of fact." ld. at 150, 355 A.2d at 463 (quoting Coffin v. Brown, 94 Md. 190,
203,50 A. 567, 572 (1901)).
53. Squire v. State, 280 Md. 132, 135,368 A.2d 1019,1020 (1977); Mason v. State, 44 Md.
App. 710,712-13,410 A.2d 633,634 (1980).
54. Sine v. State, 40 Md. App. 628, 632, 394 A.2d 1206, 1209 (1978), cert. denied, 284 Md.
748 (1979). In Sine, the jury instruction regarding allocation of the burden of proving
the voluntariness of a confession was susceptible to the improper interpretation that
the burden was on the defendant to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
his confession was involuntary. The error was held nonreviewable because of the lack
of trial objection, even though it may have resulted in some prejudice to the accused
and even though defense counsel's failure to object may have been due to either inadvertence or misapprehension regarding the correct law. ld. at 633,394 A.2d at 1210.
55. ld. at 632, 394 A.2d at 1209.
56. See generally Comment, Appeal of Errors in the Absence of Objection:
Pennsylvania's Fundamental Error Doctrine, 73 DICK. L. REV. 496, 501 (1969).
57. 287 Md. 198,411 A.2d 1035 (1980).
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guilty alternative from a trial court's jury instructions constituted reviewable plain error. Courts of other jurisdictions that
have had occasion to consider this question have generally held
that, when a trial court in its instructions to the jury either omits 58
or expressly excludes 59 a not guilty verdict, the accused has been
denied one of the fundamental aspects of his constitutional right
to a fair trial60 and appellate court correction is necessary to safeguard that right and assure that justice is done. In those cases in
which such an omission has been held to be harmless, the deficiency was deemed adequately redressed by other instructions. 61
IV. THE HUTCHINSON COURT'S ANALYSIS
The principle issue confronting the court of appeals in State v.
Hutchinson 62 was whether the unobjected to omission of a not
guilty verdict alternative from the jury instructions in a criminal
case, coupled with a misstatement by the trial judge as to the
alternatives included on the verdict sheet,63 constituted reviewable plain error. A second and related issue, which arose by virtue
of the court's affirmative answer to the above question, was
58. E.g., People v. Stockwell. 52 Mich. App. 394. 217 N.W.2d 413 (1974).
59. E.g., People v. Gibbs. 50 Mich. App. 517, 213 N.W.2d 586 (1973)(trialjudge stated to
jury that there was "no way" the jury could find that defendant did not commit the
offense alleged), leave to appeal denied, 391 Mich. 783 (1974); Commonwealth v. Edwards, 394 Pa. 335, 147 A.2d 313 (1959) (trial court instructed jury on five possible
verdicts including not guilty by reason of insanity, but omitted a not guilty instruction). Edwards may be distinguished from Hutchinson because the Edwards jury was
expressly instructed that it could return "one and only one" of the five verdicts
enumerated. Id. at 336, 147 A.2d at 314. The Hutchinson instructions were not so
limiting. See text accompanying notes 14 & 15 supra.
60. Note that the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution and article 21 of
the Maryland Declaration of Rights are the federal and state sources, respectively, of
a criminal accused's rights to a fair trial by an impartial jury. U.S. CONST. amend. VI;
MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 21. The right to a fair trial has also been held to be
implicit in the constitutional guarantee of due process. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; MD.
CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 24. See generally In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955).
Courts do not agree on the exact aspect of a criminal defendant's right to a jury
trial that is impaired when an erroneous instruction is given. See, e.g., Dimery v.
State, 274 Md. 661, 689, 338 A.2d 56, 70 (1974) (O'Donnell, J., dissenting) (right to a
"complete" jury trial), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1074 (1976); People v. Gibbs, 50 Mich.
App. 517, 213 N.W.2d 586 (1973) (right to procedural due process), leave to appeal
denied, 391 Mich. 783 (1974); Commonwealth v. Edwards, 394 Pa. 335,147 A.2d 313
(1959) (right to have jury instructed that it may return a general verdict of not
guilty). The Hutchinson court found that the omission violated the fundamental
right of a criminal defendant to have the jury instructed on all applicable verdicts.
State v. Hutchinson, 287 Md. 198,205,411 A.2d 1035, 1039 (1980).
61. See, e.g., Tarpkin v. State, 263 Ga. 67, 222 S.E.2d 364 (1976) (omission from one portion of instructions held harmless in view of later instructions that presented jury
with both guilty and not guilty options); State v. Barnes, 297 N.C. 442, 255 S.E.2d
386 (1979) (omission of not guilty alternative followed by later instruction that not
guilty verdict must be returned if jury unable to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense charged).
62. 287 Md. 198, 411 A.2d 1035 (1980).
63. See text accompanying notes 14 &15 supra.
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whether the instructions given were so inadequate as to warrant
reversal of the defendant's conviction and award of a new trial.
The two issues were integrally linked because both reviewability
and reversibility turned on the extent to which Hutchinson's
rights as a criminal defendant were iplpaired by the jury charge.
Because no prompt objection had been raised at trial and,
therefore, no appeal of right had been preserved, the court of
appeals focused its attention on the circumstances under which
discretionary review of plain error is appropriate. Judge Cole's
maj ority opinion recognized that, in the absence of prompt trial
objection, appellate courts 'ordinarily decline to review allegedly
erroneous jury instructions64 and that, in past cases, only errors of
a "compelling, extraordinary, exceptional or fundamental" nature
have' been reviewed, absent trial objection. 65 The court also noted
that a reviewing court should give due regard to whether an error
is "purely technical, the product of conscious design or trial tactics or the result of bald inattention" on the part of the complaining party because such factors militate against the exercise of discretionary review power under the plain error rule. 66
The state's contention that review of unobjected to errors in
jury instructions is inappropriate when correction could have been
achieved by pointing out the error in timely fashion to the trial
judge was rejected by the majority without any discussion of the
cases upon which that contention was based. 67 The court stated
that "such an absolute approach is the antithesis of the discretion
authorized by the rule."6B The majority buttressed its contention
with a discussion of three recent decisions by the court of appeals
and the court of special appeals that it interpreted as signaling

64.
65.
66.
67.

287 Md. 198, 202, 411 A.2d 1035, 1037 (1980).
Id. at 203, 411 A.2d at 1038.
Id.
Id. The cases supporting the state's contention are discussed in notes 42-46 and
accompanying text supra, and in text accompanying notes 101-06 infra.
68. 287 Md. 198, 203, 411 A.2d 1035, 1038 (1980).
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that correctability of an error at the trial stage is not to be viewed
as the decisive factor in determining when discretionary review of
unobjected to plain error is appropriate. 69 The majority indicated
that the essence of discretionary review of plain error is whether
the error vitally affected the right of the accused to a fair and
impartial trial. 70 In the court's assessment, recent precedent indicated that an instructional error that is "likely to unduly influence
the jury" constitutes sufficient deprivation of a criminal defendant's right to a fair trial to justify appellate review despite the
lack of timely trial objection. 71 The particular aspect of the
accused's fair trial right impaired when instructions are confusing, prejudicial, or lacking in some vital detail is "the ability of the
jury to discharge its duty of returning a true verdict based on the
evidence."72 Noting the typical sensitivity of a jury to the words of

69. The three cases were Fowler v. State, 7 Md. App. 264, 254 A.2d 715 (1969}; Barnhart
v. State, 5 Md. App. 222, 246 A.2d 280 (1968}; and Squire v. State, 280 Md. 132,368
A.2d 1019 (1977}. In Fowler, the jury was incorrectly permitted to consider the defendant's criminal record in determining his guilt or innocence_ The error was held to be
reviewable despite the lack of objection at trial. 7 Md. App. 264, 267, 254 A.2d 715,
716 (1969}. In Barnhart, the trial judge improperly revealed to the jury his
preliminary determination regarding the voluntariness of the accused's confession.
The error was deemed to be reviewable even though it was not objected to at trial. 5
Md. App. 222, 229, 246 A.2d 280, 285 (1968}. In the Hutchinson majority's view, the
errors in Fowler and Barnhart both could have been corrected had they been brought
to the attention of the trial judge. 287 Md. 198, 204-05,411 A.2d 1035, 1039 (1980}.
Both errors, however, were determined to be reviewable. Thus, the majority reasoned
that correctability of an error at trial is not to be determinative in deciding when
plain error review is appropriate. See id. at 204-05, 411 A.2d at 1038-39. The flaw in
the Hutchinson court's reasoning, however, is that it is not clear that the errors in
Fowler and Barnhart could have been adequately corrected (i.e., the resulting prejudice sufficiently cured} even if they were timely pointed out at trial.
Although the Hutchinson majority cited the Squire case as additional support
for its view that correctability of an error at trial is not to be determinative in
deciding when review under the plain error rule is appropriate, the case, as the dissent
noted, is more supportive of the opposite position. Id. at 217, 411 A.2d at 1045
(Smith, J., dissenting}. In Squire, the trial judge had given an instruction that placed
the burden of proving self-defense upon the accused. This contravened the then very
recent case of Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975}, which had held that such an
instruction violated the due process requirement that the state prove every element
of its case beyond a reasonable doubt. No objection had been made at trial and the
court of special appeals held that the plain error rule could not be invoked because the
error could have been corrected by supplemental instructions had the Mullaney case
been called to the trial judge's attention. Squire v. State, 32 Md. App. 307, 360 A.2d
443 (1976}, reu'd, 280 Md. 132,268 A.2d 1019 (1977}. Though not expressly stating
that the court of special appeals had abused its discretion by declining to recognize
the plain error, the court of appeals exercised its own independent discretion to recognize plain error and reversed. The court rested its decision in part on the rationale
that, in view of Mullaney's newness at the time of the Squire trial, its full ramifications were not yet recognized, and hence, even if Squire's defense counsel had been
sufficiently aware of Mullaney to point out the error to the trial judge, it was highly
speculative that appropriate corrective measures could have or would have been
taken. Squire v. State, 280 Md. 132,268 A.2d 1019 (1977}.
70. 287 Md. 198, 202, 411 A.2d 1035, 1038 (1980).
71. Id. at 205, 411 A.2d at 1039.
72. Id.
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a trial judge, the court of appeals stated that the judge has a duty
to avoid even inadvertent instructional improprieties that may
suggest partiality. 73
The disputed charge in the instant case was deemed by the
majority to be sufficiently violative of Hutchinson's fundamental
rights as a criminal defendant to merit consideration on appeal
despite the absence of objection by defense counsel at trial. The
court held that the-accused in a criminal case has the right to have
the jury advised on all possible verdicts stemming from the evidence, including not guilty,74 and that because the trial judge in
Hutchinson at no point instructed the jury that it could find the
defendant not guilty, Hutchinson was entitled to a new triaP5
The majority disagreed with the state's contention that the
omission was rendered harmless by the inclusion of a not guilty
alternative on the jury's verdict sheet and by earlier instructions
on the presumed innocence of the accused and the state's burden
of proving beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the
offenses charged. 76 Judge Cole underscored the prestige lent to
any verdict alternative that is expressly included in a judge's final
oral charge to the jury as opposed to the effect of merely indica ting on a printed verdict sheet that such an alternative exists. In
light of this, he concluded that the effect on the jury's verdict of
the omission of a not guilty alternative from the oral instructions
was immeasurable. With Hutchinson's criminal conviction hanging in the balance, Judge Cole refused to speculate as to whether
the instructional deficiencies were cured by implications that
could be drawn from other instructions. 77 Therefore, the court of
special appeals' determination that the error was material and
reviewable was affirmed and its award of a new trial was upheld. 7s
Judge Smith filed a strong dissent in which Chief Judge
Murphy concurred. The dissent undertook an exhaustive discussion of the line of cases supporting the prosecution's contention
that an error that is correctable and not objected to at the trial
stage should not be recognized on appeal. 79 Because the error in
the instant case could have been easily rectified at trial had it been
promptly pointed out, Judge Smith viewed the situation as an
inappropriate one for invocation of plain error review. so The dis73. Id. at 206, 411 A.2d at 1040.
74. Id. at 205, 411 A.2d at 1039. A recent court of special appeals decision interprets
Hutchinson as not "flatly requiring an affirmative instruction that the jury must
return a verdict of not guilty if the state fails to sustain its burden of proof where
such a requirement is clearly implicit from other instructions given." Dove v. State,
47 Md. App. 452, 456, 423 A.2d 597, 600 (1980).
75. 287 Md. 198, 208, 411 A.2d 1035, 1041 (1980).
76. Id. at 206-08, 411 A.2d at 1039-41.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 209-18, 411 A.2d at 1041-46 (Smith, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 218, 411 A.2d at 1046.
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sent was puzzled by the majority's disregard of this welldocumented precedent. 81 Moreover, it was concerned that the
majority's decision would precipitate the type of unscrupulous
trial practice that strict application of the plain error rule prevents, namely, the strategy of allowing an erroneous instruction
to pass without comment, with reasonable assurance that it will
afford grounds for appeal in the event of an adverse decision at
the trial level. 82
Judge Smith believed that the omission of the verbal not
guilty instruction was sufficiently compensated for by other instructions given by the trial judge and by the inclusion of the
omitted alternative on the verdict sheet. 8s In addition, the dissent
was willing to attribute to all jurors a certain minimal level of intelligence and a basic comprehension of the judicial process sufficient to alert them to the possibility of a not guilty v.~rdict in _a
criminal case. 84 In light of these mitigating circumstances, the dissent concluded that this case did not present an error as severe or
glaring as those that have motivated past courts to grant discretionary review. 85 In Judge Smith's estimation, the majority was
merely engaging in a "quest for error,"86 and in its haste to protect
Hutchinson's right to a fair trial, the court had effectuated an
over-balancing of the scales of justice detrimental to the state's
rights as a litigant. 87
V. EVALUATION
The decision of the court of appeals in Hutchinson that theomission of a not guilty verdict choice from the oral jury charge in
a criminal case constitutes reviewable plain error whe~ ac~ompa"
nied by a trial court's misstatement of the verdict sheetz's contents
81. Judge Smith posed this question: "Is it the intent of the majority to overrule all "of
these cases sub silentio?" Id.
82. Id. A decision by counsel not to object to a particular error at trial for reasons of
strategy constitutes grounds for denial of federal habeas corpus relief, and, in some
situations, relief can be denied even when the accused does not expressly consent wor participate in the tactic. See Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 451 (1965). Denial
of relief is based upon the view that strategic n6n-objection constitutes a deliberate
bypass of orderly court procedure. Id. at 452. For a discussion of Maryland and
federal cases involving situations in which tactical failure to raise an issue in a prior
court proceeding furnished grounds for denial of post conviction relief, see Curtis v.
State, 284 Md. 132, 395 A.2d 464 (1978).
In addition to its effect on a criminal defendant's ability to obtain post conviction
relief, an attorney's deliberate failure to object to an error at trial may have other
consequences. For example, by deliberately not raising an objection for reasons of
strategy, an attorney risks bar sanctions for misconduct. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(5), DR 7-106(A), DR 7-106(C)(7), EC 7-20, EC
7-25.
83. 287 Md. 198,218-19,411 A.2d 1035, 1046 (1980) (Smith, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 218-21, 411 A.2d at 1046-47.
85. Id. at 209, 411 A.2d at 1041.
86. Id. at 221, 411 A.2d at 1047 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189, 202
(1943) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
87. 287 Md. 198, 222, 411 A.2d 1035, 1048 (1980) (Smith, J., dissenting).
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is admirable. It demonstrates a cautious regard for the fair trial
right of a criminal defendant and an appreciation for the devastating consequences of a guilty verdict returned by a jury that was
possibly confused or not as well informed as it could have been on
the available verdict alternatives. At the same time, the court's
decision to classify the particular instructional inadequacies at
issue in Hutchinson as reviewable plain error is regrettable. A
proper determination that an instructional error is material for
purposes of plain error review requires not only a resort to guiding
precedent to see what types of errors have been deemed material
in the past, but also a realistic assessment of the circumstances of
each case to determine the likelihood that the error actually
detrimentally influenced the jury's verdict. Thus, a certain
amount of subjective evaluation is involved which lends a frustrating element of unpredictability to the process of determining
what constitutes reviewable plain error. By classifying as reviewable, errors that appear to have had only a slight possibility of
detrimentally influencing the jury's verdict, the Hutchinson decision adds to rather than eliminates some of the uncertainty that
exists in the area of plain error review. Indeed, after Hutchinson it
appears that as long as a majority of the judges sitting in appellate review of a criminal case can construct a supportive argument
that the defendant's fair trial right was somehow possibly impaired by an erroneous jury instruction, they may review the case
even though no objection to the error was made at trial to preserve the issue.
An exceptionally strong argument can be made that despite
the trial judge's omission and misstatement regarding the contents of the verdict sheet, Hutchinson's jury was fully aware of its
option to return a not guilty verdict and simply chose not to do so
because it felt that the evidence of guilt dictated otherwise. The
jury received thorough instructions on the presumed innocence of
a criminal defendant and on the state's burden of proof in a criminal trial. The trial judge advised the jury, inter alia, that
[t]he burden of proof is on the State to prove every element of the crime charged against the defendant, and the
defendant is presumed innocent until proved guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. That presumption attends the
defendant throughout the trial until or unless overcome
by proof establishing his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
and to a moral certainty.88

88. Brief and Appendix for Appellant at E.22, State v. Hutchinson, 287 Md. 198, 411
A.2d 1035 (1980).
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The logical deduction to be drawn from this instruction is that if a
reasonable doubt exists, the jury cannot find the defendant
guilty.89 To deny that the jury is capable of making this deduction
would be inconsistent with the confidence placed in the jury's
ability to think logically with respect to other aspects of the case.
Regarding the evaluation of circumstantial evidence, for example,
it is commonly said that a jury is permitted to draw all reasonable
inferences stemming from the evidence presented. 90 This rule presupposes that members of the jury possess certain basic powers of
reasoning and logical deduction. To attribute to jurors a certain
level of intelligence for some purposes and subsequently deny in
effect that they possess such -capacity is the epitome of self-contradiction. Yet, the court's ruling in Hutchinson that beyond-areasonable-doubt and presumption-of-innocence instructions are
insufficient to alert the average juror to the fact that not guilty is
an available verdict alternative91 is tantamount to a declaration
that the jury is incapable of making even the simplest of logical
deductions. It is difficult to reconcile this apparent lack of respect
for a jury's skills in comprehending jury instructions with the
reliance placed upon its analytical skills at other stages in the
judicial process. 92
The majority in Hutchinson noted that the trial court's dual
error of omission and misstatement "may well have placed the
jury in such a quandry that it was unsure what its obligation to
the defendant was. "93 The court did not address the possibility
that the lack of objection by trial counsel and the absence of any
request by the jury for clarifying instructions suggests that those
present in the courtroom understood perfectly that when the trial

89. A recent Maryland case supports the contention that when both presumption-ofinnocence and beyond-a-reasonable-doubt instructions are clearly communicated to a
jury, the absence of an express "not guilty" instruction in a criminal case is sufficiently compensated for and does not constitute reviewable plain error under Maryland Rule 757(h). Dove v. State, 47 Md. App. 452, 456, 423 A.2d 597, 600 (1980). Dove
differs from Hutchinson in that the omission of a "not guilty" instruction in Dove
was not accompanied by a misstatement of the contents of the jury's verdict sheet
that could have conceivably created confusion in the jury's mind regarding the availability of the "not guilty" alternative. Id.
90. United States v. Townsend, 474 F.2d 209, 213 (5th Cir. 1973); Quarles v. United
States, 308 A.2d 773, 775 (D.C. 1973).
91. 287 Md. 198, 207-08, 411 A.2d 1035, 1040 (1980).
92. This apparent inconsistency is perhaps reconcilable by imputing to the Hutchinson
court the view that juries are more adept at drawing inferences from facts than from
the law presented to them.
93. 287 Md. 198, 208, 411 A.2d 1035, 1041 (1980).
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judge said the verdict sheet contained two possible verdicts, he
meant two possible guilty verdicts. 94 Moreover, it is important to
note that the trial judge at no time instructed the jury that it had
to return a verdict of guilty.95 He merely stated that if the jury
found the defendant not guilty of rape in the first degree then it
was to "consider" a verdict of rape in the second degree. 96 Thus,
there was no genuine or substantial conflict between the oral
instructions and the written verdict sheet that could support a
claim that the instructions were inherently ambiguous or a
definite source of confusion. At most the omission and misstatement may have created a tenuous misconception regarding the
availability of the not guilty alternative - a misconception that,
in all likelihood, was. amply rectified by other instructions that
strongly suggested the availability of the not guilty option and by
the inclusion of "not guilty" as an alternative on the jury's verdict
sheet. 97
There is considerable substance to the dissent's contention
that the errors of the instant case lacked the deleterious properties that have characterized reviewable plain error in the past.
This was not a case in which the trial judge neglected to instruct
the jurors on some point of substantive law of which they would
have no means of knowing except through judicial advice. 98 Nor
do the errors in the instant case carry with them the unquestiona94. This point illustrates one of the major imperfections of the plain error rule. A reviewing court's perception of events at trial is limited to the information contained in the
written record. It cannot grasp all the connotations of the spoken word at trial. An
appellate court is, therefore, forced to evaluate the materiality of an alleged instructional error without the benefit of knowing with what force, emotion, or inflection the
controversial instruction was delivered. "What may appear to be serious error on
paper to the appellate court may actually have been harmless and sufficiently deemphasized as to have had no impact on the jury _" Comment, Appeal of Errors in the
A bsence of Objection: Pennsylvania's Fundamental Error Doctrine, 73 DICK. L. REV_
496, 502 (1969).
95. Brief and Appendix for Appellant at 8, State v. Hutchinson, 287 Md. 198,411 A.2d
1035 (1980).
96. 287 Md. 198, 201, 411 A.2d 1035, 1037 (1980).
97. In evaluating an alleged instructional error, a reviewing court is to consider the
instructions as a whole. It is not to read isolated portions out of context. State v.
Garland, 278 Md. 212, 220, 362 A.2d 638, 642 (1976).
Another circumstance that tended to mitigate the effect of the alleged errors in
Hutchinson and that should have prompted the jury's awareness of the not guilty
alternative was the considerable emphasis placed on that option by defense counsel
during his closing argument to the jury. See Brief and Appendix for Appellant at E.
12-16, State v. Hutchinson, 287 Md. 198, 411 A.2d 1035 (1980).
98. Compare State v. Hutchinson, 287 Md. 198, 411 A.2d 1035 (1980) with People v.
Glass, 266 Cal. App. 2d 222, 71 Cal Rptr. 858 (1968). Glass was cited by the majority
in Hutchinson as authority supportive of its decision to review, 287 Md. 198,206-07,
411 A.2d 1035, 1040 (1980), but it is distinguishable from Hutchinson. In Glass, the
judge omitted from his recitation of verdict alternatives the choice of finding the
defendant guilty of manslaughter with gross negligence. 266 Cal. App. 2d 222, 228,
71 Cal. Rptr. 858, 862 (1968). Unlike the omission of a simple not guilty alternative,
the exclusion in Glass was of an alternative that no jury of laymen could reasonably
be expected to be aware absent judicial explanation.
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bly prejudicial effects of either an unmitigated misallocation of
the burden of proof in a criminal case99 or an impermissible disclosure to a jury of a trial court's preliminary determination that a
criminal defendant's confession was voluntary.lOo Moreover, the
remedial effect of other portions of the jury instructions in Hutchinson rendered the controversial omissions less glaring than those
formerly considered reviewable.
The Hutchinson court's categorical rejection of the WolfeReynolds line of cases,IOI which employed rigid standards to
achieve restrictive application of the plain error rule, was proper l02
but should have been accompanied by an explanation of the underlying reasons for doing so. As did its predecessors, rule 757(h) of
the Maryland Rules of Procedure has two operative parts: one
dealing with the prerequisites for securing an appeal of right, and
the other providing for discretionary review. l03 The purpose of the
"appeal of right" portion is to encourage observance of procedural
rules and, simultaneously, to promote a certain amount of
deference and courtesy to the trial judge in recognition of his difficult task. 104 The purpose of the discretionary review segment is
to provide a mechanism for assuring that, above all else, the
criminal defendant receives the fair and impartial trial to which he
is entitled. l05 Both portions of the rule must be considered in determining when discretionary review is appropriate. The restrictive application that the rule received at the hands of Maryland
appellate courts before Hutchinson l06 may be attributed to an
emphasis by those courts on the first portion of the rule and on the
benefits to be derived from encouraging strict adherence to the
proper procedures for obtaining appellate review. The liberal
application of the rule by the court in Hutchinson reflects a shift
in focus to the purposes to be served by the latter portion of the
rule and a cautious regard for the rights of criminal defendants.
Thus, the difference between courts that liberally apply the rule
and those that have conservatively applied it may be attributed to
the different emphasis placed upon the two portions of the rule in
the interest of effectuating what is perceived to be the dominant
purpose of the rule as a whole.
See Squire v. State, 280 Md. 132,368 A.2d 1019 (1977).
See Barnhart v. State, 5 Md. App. 222, 246 A.2d 280 (1968).
287 Md. 198, 203, 411 A.2d 1035, 1038 (1980).
See text accompanying notes 42-51 supra and notes 50 & 51 supra.
See note 2 supra.
Moreovc.·, this portion of the rule arguably serves to promote judicial economy by
avoiding a multiplicity of proceedings and to secure finality of case disposition so
that the rehabilitative aspect of the corrections process may begin. This goes beyond
mere courtesy.
105. See note 34 supra.
106. E.g., Reynolds v. State, 219 Md. 319, 149 A.2d 774 (1959); Wolfe v. State, 218 Md.
449, 146 A.2d 856 (1958); Brown v. State, 14 Md. App. 415, 287 A.2d 62, cert. denied,
265 Md. 736 (1972). See notes 42-51 and accompanying text supra.

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
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The Hutchinson court's liberal application of the plain error
rule could create legitimate fears that, in time, exceptions made to
the general rule will begin to swallow the rule itself. The decision
perhaps signals the beginning of a trend toward plain error review
of progressively less harmful mistakes than those deemed reviewable in the past, in contravention of the apparent purpose behind
narrowly crafting an exception to the general rule that unobjected
to errors in jury instructions are unreviewable. l07 This purpose
was formerly effectuated by reserving plain error review for errors
of exceptionally harmful dimensions. l08 In choosing to review the
errors at issue in Hutchinson, which were not as egregious as
those formerly marking the outer boundaries of material plain
error,109 the court of appeals seemingly disregarded the narrowness of the exception and indicated, by example, an intention to
expand the domain of plain error review. The court achieved this
expansion by reinterpreting what constitutes material error for
purposes of the plain error rule. The court equated the phrase
"material to the rights of the defendant" used in rule 757(h) with
the phrase "vitally affecting his right to a fair and impartial
trial. "110 Because the right to a fair trial encompasses a myriad of
other rights, its establishment as the touchstone of plain error
review carries the potential for tremendous 'expansion of the realm
of appellate jurisdiction.
Unfortunately, this expansive reading of the plain error rule is
unaccompanied by any clear standard to which appellate courts
and lawyers in the future may refer to judge how likely an impact
on a jury's verdict an error must have to be reviewable. The
Hutchinson court professes to delineate reviewable plain error as
error that is "likely" to influence a jury.11l Yet its example in
granting review of the instant case, in which it was speculative,
indeed highly unlikely, that the jury was misled by the disputed
errors refutes this. In refusing to speculate on ll2 and realistically
assess the impact of the instructional inaccuracies on the verdict
in Hutchinson, the court indicated that it is inclined to grant
review whenever there is the slightest possibility that an imperfect instruction detrimentally influenced a jury. Because the
Hutchinson court actually applied a standard different from the
one it pronounced, no standard for determining the requisite
107, The fact that the plain error rule exists as an exception to the general rule that unpreserved instructional errors are not reviewable suggests that its drafters intended it
to be narrowly construed. That the rule includes language limiting review to errors
materially aff(,~ting the rights of the accused, see note 2 supra, is further evidence
that the rule is not to be expansively applied.
108. See notes 52-53 and accompanying text supra.
109. See cases discussed note 69 supra.
110. 287 Md. 198, 202, 411 A.2d 1035, 1038 (1980).
111. [d. at 205, 411 A.2d at 1038.
112. [d. at 208, 411 A.2d at 1041.
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impact that an error must have on the jury to merit plain error
review emerges with convincing clarity.
Perhaps because the stakes are so high in a criminal case and
there is no way, short of breaching jury secrecy, to be certain of
the influence of a particular error on the verdict, plain error review
should be granted even when there is only a remote possibility
that an error was damaging. Although such a standard may be
criticized as being too generous to a criminal defendant in that it
comes close to assuring him the right to a perfect trial rather than
a fair one,113 it serves the apparent purpose behind the plain error
rule 1l4 by assuring that no miscarriage of justice will be allowed to
pass unrectified despite the lack of observance of procedural
requirements.
In view of the expansive application of the plain error rule by
the Hutchinson court, the concern expressed by the dissent that
the decision will foster less competent practice in the legal profession and a disrespect for the integrity of the judicial system as a
whole ll5 appears legitimate. Hutchinson is available as supportive
precedent for those urging discretionary review of slightly tainted
jury instructions even though no objection was registered at trial.
The decision thus serves to limit the repercussions of an attorney's failure to raise timely trial objection to disputed jury instructions. 1I6 Although the court warned that technical mistakes
in jury instructions and errors resulting from either bald inattention or trial strategy are inconsistent with circumstances justifying invocation of the power of plain error review,117 the stringency
with which these warnings will be enforced is subject to serious
question. The admonition regarding technicality of error,1I8 for
example, seems purely cosmetic because the parameters of
technical error are by no means clear, and, as evidenced by Hutchinson, an argument can be made that errors of any magnitude
have some impact on a jury's verdict. When appellate courts reverse on grounds that appear technical or trivial to a layman, public confidence in the judicial system may be diminished. The
court's caveat that bald inattention and trial strategy are unacceptable explanations for an attorney's failure to object1l9 appears
113. "A defendant is entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one." Lutwak v. United
States, 344 U.S. 604, 619 (1973); accord, Crawford v. State, 285 Md. 431, 451, 404
A.2d 244, 254 (1979). The knowledge that appellate court justices apparently sit
ready to correct almost any error his own attorney may overlook should be of addi·
tional comfort to the accused. But see note 38 supra (discussing the rule of harmless
error).
114. See note 34 supra.
115. 287 Md. 198, 218, 411 A.2d 1035, 1046 (1980) (Smith, J., dissenting).
116. Note, however, that an attorney who chooses to speculate on the stringency with
which the court's procedural rules will be enforced risks being sanctioned by the bar
for malpractice. See note 82 supra.
117. 287 Md. 198,203,411 A.2d 1035,1038 (1980).
118. Id.
119. Id.
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equally superficial. Short of a confession by the attorney himself,
an appellate court cannot be sure of counsel's motives, strategic
or otherwise, in not promptly objecting to an error in the instructions. Moreover, the Hutchinson court conducted no inquiry into
the motive behind defense counsel's failure to object, which indicates an intention to look beyond such considerations and to focus
exclusively upon whether a defendant's fair trial right was
infringed.
Despite the toothless nature of the court's warnings, the possibility that the plain error rule will be employed as a defense
strategy is not to be overemphasized. A defense attorney, recognizing that discretionary review of plain error is erratic, unreliable, and uncertain, is not likely to depend on it to obtain review.
Only if the prospect of acquittal were slim, would it be advantageous for an attorney to risk deliberate non-objection. 120 In addition, the prosecution has an interest in purging the trial of all
taints that could conceivably furnish the accused with grounds for
appeal. The prosecution, therefore, will be inclined to call an
obvious error to the trial court's attention and thereby disrupt the
strategy of the defense.
VI. CONCLUSION
The court of appeals in Hutchinson conducted a rather limited
examination of the trial court record in the course of evaluating
the materiality of disputed errors in the jury instructions. The
particular facts of the Hutchinson trial permit a conclusion that
the jury was aware of the not guilty alternative despite the deficiencies of the instructions given. Consequently, the court's
assessment that the mistakes at issue constituted errors material
to the rights of the accused, that is, that they amounted to reviewable plain error, seems unrealistic, but such a decision was
necessitated by a concern for the rights of criminal defendants. _
Had the court ruled for the state in this instance, its determination might have been viewed as an endorsement of the practice of
omitting a simple not guilty verdict from the advisory instructions in a criminal case. This would have been unacceptable precedent to establish for it would condone laxity on the part of the
courts that might prove to be prejudicial to future criminal
defendants.
While the decision correctly repudiated older, more absolute
standards for deciding the appropriateness of discretionary
review of plain error in a particular instance, it did so without
advancing a convincing supportive rationale. Furthermore, the
replacement standard set forth in the opinion, with its focus upon
120. But see ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(5), DR 7-106(A),
DR 7-l06(C)(7), EC 7-20, EC 7-25.
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whether the accused's rights to a fair trial are vitally affected by
an error, lends itself to expansive application and was unsupplemented by a clear statement of limitation regarding how likely an
impact on the jury's verdict an erroneous instruction must have in
order to be considered reviewable. As a result, Maryland attorneys have no way of ascertaining, with any reasonable degree of
certainty, what types of errors will be deemed sufficiently
material to the rights of the accused to warrant plain error review.
Eventually, the court should set forth a clear and unequivocal
statement of the purpose underlying the plain error rule in order
to guide courts and attorneys confronted with questions concerning its application in a particular instance. The court must also
unambiguously verbalize a standard for determining how likely an
error is to have detrimentally affected a jury's verdict before it
will be considered reviewable absent trial objection. In Hutchinson, a chance to achieve both of these goals was presented but the
court of appeals failed to resolve these uncertainties.
For the present, the plain error rule is still susceptible to random application. It furnishes a convenient basis for an appellate
court to award a new trial whenever it perceives that justice was
not served in the lower court and that the defendant did not
receive the fair trial to which he is entitled. This cautious regard
for the fair trial right of the criminal defendant is commendable if
properly balanced against the state's rights as a litigant. The
broad concept of a fair trial, which Hutchinson indicates is the
touchstone of plain error review, defies comprehensive
definition.121 This, in turn, lends an element of unpredictability to
the process of granting appellate review under the plain error rule.
If, in the future, Maryland courts would supplement their determinations that particular instances of plain error are reviewable
with clearly articulated reasoning that is consistent with a firm
statement of the underlying purpose of the plain error rule, the
permissible limits of plain error review could be more readily
ascertained and erratic application of the rule eventually could be
elimina ted.

Kevin Hessler

121. See Orfield, Criminal Appeals: Technicality and Prejudicial Error, 27 J. CRIM. L.C. &
P.S. 668, 673 (19371.

